Informed Trading from Tax Havens

58 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2024

See all articles by Cheol-Won Yang

Cheol-Won Yang

Dankook University Business School

Jaewon Choi

Seoul National University - Department of Economics

Woojin Kim

Seoul National University - Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: August 03, 2024

Abstract

Cross-border trades from tax havens provide significant information for short-term future stock returns. Using a unique account-level dataset that includes investors' country of origin, we find that three-day portfolio returns based on net buys from tax havens amount to 0.47% per day for institutional trades and 0.33% per day for individual trades. Profitable institutional trades tend to originate from jurisdictions with a high corporate tax haven index and involve accounts trading multiple stocks. In contrast, profitable individual trades come from jurisdictions with high financial secrecy and involve accounts trading only one stock. Additionally, tax haven individual accounts are particularly profitable in stocks with poor corporate governance. Overall, our results suggest that institutional trades in tax havens reflect superior stock-picking ability, while individual trades are consistent with the use of insider information.

Keywords: Informed Trading, Anonymity, Stock Picking Ability, Insider Information, Tax Haven

Suggested Citation

Yang, Cheol-Won and Choi, Jaewon and Kim, Woojin, Informed Trading from Tax Havens (August 03, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4914934

Cheol-Won Yang (Contact Author)

Dankook University Business School ( email )

152 Jukjeon-ro Suji-gu
Yongin-si Gyenggi-do
Yongin-si, Gyenggi-do 16890
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Jaewon Choi

Seoul National University - Department of Economics ( email )

Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Woojin Kim

Seoul National University - Business School ( email )

1 Gwanak-ro, Gwanak-gu
Seoul, 08826
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)
82-2-880-5831 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://cba.snu.ac.kr/en/faculty?mode=view&memberidx=60582&major=6

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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