Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job Search: Theory and Evidence

65 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2004

See all articles by Pierre Cahuc

Pierre Cahuc

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE); Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA); University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Fabien Postel-Vinay

University of Bristol; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Structural Econometrics (CSE)

Jean-Marc Robin

École Normale Supérieure (ENS) - Laboratoire d'Economie Theorique et Appliquee (LEA); National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST); French National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: December 2003

Abstract

The Nash wage bargaining model is ubiquitous in modern labour economics. Yet most applications of this model ignore inter-employer competition for labour services and attribute all of the workers' rent to their bargaining power. In this Paper, we write and estimate an equilibrium model with strategic wage bargaining and on-the-job search and use it to take another look at the determinants of wages in France. There are three essential determinants of wages in our model: productivity, competition between employers resulting from on-the-job search, and the workers' bargaining power. We find that between-firm competition matters a lot in the determination of wages, as it is quantitatively more important than wage bargaining a la Nash in raising wages above the workers' 'reservation wages', defined as out-of-work income. In particular, we detect no significant bargaining power for intermediate- and low-skilled workers, and a modestly positive bargaining power for high-skilled workers. In addition, the Paper provides some empirical information on the nature of sorting of workers by firms.

Keywords: Search frictions, structural estimation, wage bargaining, labour market competition

JEL Classification: J31, J41, J64

Suggested Citation

Cahuc, Pierre and Postel-Vinay, Fabien and Robin, Jean-Marc, Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job Search: Theory and Evidence (December 2003). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4154. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=491602

Pierre Cahuc (Contact Author)

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE) ( email )

92245 Malakoff Cedex
France

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA) ( email )

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France
+33 1 4117 3717 (Phone)
+33 1 4117 3724 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://eurequa.univ-paris1.fr/membres/cahuc/

University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
75647 Paris Cedex 13
France
+33 4 44 07 82 06 (Phone)
+33 4 44 07 82 02 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Fabien Postel-Vinay

University of Bristol ( email )

University of Bristol,
Senate House, Tyndall Avenue
Bristol, BS8 ITH
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Structural Econometrics (CSE) ( email )

Department of Economics, University of Bristol
8 Woodland Road
Bristol, BS8 1TN
United Kingdom

Jean-Marc Robin

École Normale Supérieure (ENS) - Laboratoire d'Economie Theorique et Appliquee (LEA) ( email )

48 boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
France
+33 1 4313 6365 (Phone)
+33 1 4313 6362 (Fax)

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST)

15 Boulevard Gabriel Peri
15 Boulevard Gabriel Peri
Malakoff Cedex, 1 92245
France

French National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)

147, rue de l'Universite
Paris Cedex 07, 78-Yvelines 75338
France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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