Log-Rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff

36 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 1998  

Randall S. Kroszner

Booth School of Business, University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Douglas A. Irwin

Dartmouth College - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: March 1996

Abstract

We analyze Senate roll-call votes concerning tariffs on specific goods in order to understand the economic and political factors influencing the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. Contrary to recent studies emphasizing the partisan nature of the Congressional votes, our reading of the debates in the Congressional Record suggests that the final, party-line voting masks a rich vote- trading dynamic. We estimate a logit model of specific tariff votes that permits us to identify (a) important influences of specific producer beneficiaries in each Senator's constituency and (b) log- rolling coalitions among Senators with otherwise unrelated constituency interests which succeeded in raising tariff rates.

Suggested Citation

Kroszner, Randall S. and Irwin, Douglas A., Log-Rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff (March 1996). NBER Working Paper No. w5510. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4917

Randall S. Kroszner

Booth School of Business, University of Chicago ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-8779 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/randall.kroszner/re

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Douglas A. Irwin (Contact Author)

Dartmouth College - Department of Economics ( email )

6106 Rockefeller Hall
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-2942 (Phone)
603-646-2122 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
34
Abstract Views
743