Strategically Timed Voluntary Disclosures before Conferences: Global Evidence

HKUST Business School Research Paper No. 2024-176

Forthcoming in Journal of International Accounting Research

54 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2024 Last revised: 29 Nov 2024

See all articles by Shiheng Wang

Shiheng Wang

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST)

Emily Jing Wang

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Accounting

Date Written: August 08, 2024

Abstract

This study examines how firms strategically time their voluntary disclosures before attending conferences in the global market. We document four findings. First, conference firms provide more voluntary disclosures of positive news and experience better stock performance in the month before conferences than in the month after. Second, firms that attend low-visibility conferences, have limited conference experience, face greater shareholder pressure, or have less concentrated ownership are more likely to increase their voluntary disclosures of positive news before conferences. Third, non-U.S. firms domiciled in jurisdictions with stronger investor protection and financial institutions are more likely to increase their voluntary disclosures of positive news and experience a stock price run-up before conferences. Finally, positive news disclosures before conferences attract more favorable market reactions to conference presentations and greater analyst following and institutional holdings. Overall, conference firms in the global market strategically coordinate their disclosures to maximize the economic impacts of conference attendance. 

Suggested Citation

Wang, Shiheng and Wang, Emily Jing, Strategically Timed Voluntary Disclosures before Conferences: Global Evidence (August 08, 2024). HKUST Business School Research Paper No. 2024-176, Forthcoming in Journal of International Accounting Research, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4919959 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4919959

Shiheng Wang (Contact Author)

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) ( email )

Clear Water Bay
Kowloon, 999999
Hong Kong
(852) 2358 7570 (Phone)
(852) 2358 1693 (Fax)

Emily Jing Wang

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Accounting ( email )

Clear Water Bay
Kowloon
Hong Kong

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