Lost-Premium Damages in M&A: Delaware's New Legal Landscape

Yale Journal on Regulation Bulletin, Forthcoming

12 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2024

See all articles by Jonathan Chan

Jonathan Chan

McGill University - Faculty of Law

Martin Petrin

University of Western Ontario

Date Written: August 08, 2024

Abstract

In the event of a buyer's willful breach of a merger agreement, lost-premium provisions allow a target corporation to claim damages that include the lost premium or economic entitlements that its stockholders would have received had the deal closed. While the Delaware Chancery Court in Crispo v. Musk held these provisions to be unenforceable under the anti-penalty doctrine, in this Article we argue that lost-premium provisions are doctrinally defensible, economically sensible, and supported by a host of policy considerations. Lost-premium provisions have become enforceable in Delaware effective from August 1, 2024, following amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law, but the issue may well crop up again in other jurisdictions. Should this occur, this Article explains why courts in other states without similar statutory provisions still have a credible way of upholding lost-premium provisions and increasing transaction certainty.

Keywords: M&A, damages, remedies, lost premium, Crispo v. Musk, mergers, breach of contract, Con Ed provisions, corporate law, DGCL

JEL Classification: K20, K22, K12, G34

Suggested Citation

Chan, Jonathan and Petrin, Martin, Lost-Premium Damages in M&A: Delaware's New Legal Landscape (August 08, 2024). Yale Journal on Regulation Bulletin, Forthcoming
, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4920293 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4920293

Jonathan Chan (Contact Author)

McGill University - Faculty of Law ( email )

3644 Peel Street
Montreal H3A 1W9, Quebec H3A 1W9
Canada

Martin Petrin

University of Western Ontario ( email )

1151 Richmond Street
London, ON, N6A 3K7
Canada

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