Contested Transparency: Digital Monitoring Technologies and Worker Voice

58 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2024

See all articles by Stefano Dughera

Stefano Dughera

University of Turin

Gabriel Burdin

University of Leeds - Faculty of Business; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Filippo Belloc

University of Siena - Department of Economics and Statistics

Fabio Landini

University of Parma

Abstract

Advances in artificial intelligence and data analytics have notably expanded employers’ monitoring and surveillance capabilities. While new digital monitoring (DM) technologies facilitate the accurate observability of work effort, their productivity and broader welfare implications remain subject of debate. In this context, many countries confer information, consultation and co-determination rights to employee representation (ER) bodies on matters related to workplace organization and the introduction of new technologies, which could potentially discourage employers from making DM investments. Using a cross-sectional sample of more than 21000 European establishments, we find instead that establishments with ER are more likely to utilize DM technologies than establishments without ER. We also document a positive effect of ER on DM utilization in the context of a localrandomization regression discontinuity analysis that exploits size-contingent policy rules governing the operation of ER bodies in Europe. We rationalize this unexpected finding through the lens of a theoretical model in which shared governance via ER creates organizational safeguards that mitigate workers’ control-averse responses to monitoring.

Keywords: Digital monitoring technologiees, control aversion, worker voice, employee representation

Suggested Citation

Dughera, Stefano and Burdin, Gabriel and Belloc, Filippo and Landini, Fabio, Contested Transparency: Digital Monitoring Technologies and Worker Voice. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4922126

Stefano Dughera (Contact Author)

University of Turin ( email )

Gabriel Burdin

University of Leeds - Faculty of Business ( email )

Leeds LS2 9JT
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Filippo Belloc

University of Siena - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Piazza San Francesco 7
Siena, Siena 53100
Italy

Fabio Landini

University of Parma ( email )

Parma
Italy

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