On the Desirability of Fiscal Constraints in a Monetary Union

16 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2004 Last revised: 3 Feb 2004

See all articles by Varadarajan V. Chari

Varadarajan V. Chari

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics; Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Patrick J. Kehoe

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Research Department; University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2004

Abstract

The desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to follow its policies. If it can commit, then debt constraints can only impose costs. If it cannot commit, then fiscal policy has a free-rider problem, and debt constraints may be desirable. This type of free-rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem.

Suggested Citation

Chari, Varadarajan V. and Kehoe, Patrick J., On the Desirability of Fiscal Constraints in a Monetary Union (January 2004). NBER Working Paper No. w10232. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=492345

Varadarajan V. Chari

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics ( email )

271 19th Avenue South
1108 Management & Economics
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-626-7151 (Phone)

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis ( email )

90 Hennepin Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55480
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Patrick J. Kehoe (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Research Department ( email )

90 Hennepin Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55480
United States
612-204-5525 (Phone)
612-204-5515 (Fax)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics ( email )

271 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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