Incentives vs. Control: An Analysis of U.S. Dual-Class Companies

34 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2004 Last revised: 26 Jun 2022

See all articles by Paul A. Gompers

Paul A. Gompers

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Joy L. Ishii

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Andrew Metrick

Yale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Yale University - Yale Program on Financial Stability

Date Written: January 2004

Abstract

Dual-class common stock allows for the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights across the different classes of equity. We construct a large sample of dual-class firms in the United States and analyze the relationships of insider's cash flow rights and voting rights with firm value, performance, and investment behavior. We find that relationship of firm value to cash flow rights is positive and concave and the relationship to voting rights is negative and convex. Identical quadratic relationships are found for the respective ownership variables with sales growth, capital expenditures, and the combination of R&D and advertising. Our evidence is consistent with an entrenchment effect of voting control that leads managers to underinvest and an incentive effect of cash flow ownership that induces managers to pursue more aggressive strategies.

Suggested Citation

Gompers, Paul A. and Ishii, Joy L. and Metrick, Andrew, Incentives vs. Control: An Analysis of U.S. Dual-Class Companies (January 2004). NBER Working Paper No. w10240, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=492353

Paul A. Gompers (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )

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Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Joy L. Ishii

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

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United States

Andrew Metrick

Yale School of Management ( email )

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United States
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HOME PAGE: http://faculty.som.yale.edu/andrewmetrick/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Yale University - Yale Program on Financial Stability

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P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

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