Antitrust for Immigrants

Cornell Law Review

62 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2024

See all articles by Greg Day

Greg Day

University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business; Yale University - Yale Information Society Project

Date Written: August 01, 2024

Abstract

Immigrants and undocumented people have often encountered discrimination because they compete against "native" businesses and workers, resulting in protests, boycotts, and even violence intended to exclude immigrants from markets. Key to this story is government's ability to discriminate as well: it is indeed common for state and federal actors to enact protectionist laws and regulations meant to prevent immigrants from braiding hair, manicuring nails, operating food trucks, or otherwise competing. But antitrust courts have seldom mentioned a person's immigration status, much less offered a remedy. 

This Article shows that antitrust's "consumer welfare" standard has curiously ignored the plight of immigrants. Part of the reason is that antitrust law is characterized as a "colorblind" regime beneftting consumers collectively, meaning that it isn't supposed to prioritize insular groups such as immigrants. Courts and scholars have also described matters of inequality and discrimination as "social harms" existing beyond antitrust's scope. In fact, antitrust lawsuits have successfully sought to drive immigrants out of markets, alleging that competitors gained an "unfair" advantage from employing undocumented workers. Under this view of antitrust law, the exclusion of immigrants is an appropriate way of promoting competition. 

This Article argues that anti-immigrant discrimination creates the exact types of harms that antitrust was meant to remedy. Since excluding immigrants can misallocate resources on citizenship or racial lines as opposed to their most productive usages, certain acts of discrimination should entail "conduct without a legitimate business purpose," even when based.

Suggested Citation

Day, Gregory, Antitrust for Immigrants (August 01, 2024). Cornell Law Review, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4926129 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4926129

Gregory Day (Contact Author)

University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business ( email )

Brooks Hall
Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States

Yale University - Yale Information Society Project ( email )

127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06511
United States

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