Industrial Policy and International Cooperation

24 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2024

See all articles by Bernard Hoekman

Bernard Hoekman

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Douglas Nelson

Tulane University - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 01, 2024

Abstract

Industrial policy interventions affecting international trade and investment are motivated by a mix of economic and noneconomic objectives. Some are explicitly protectionist, targeting an expansion of domestic production, others are not but have adverse impacts on trade, reducing the potential role of trade as a means to help attain noneconomic objectives efficiently. The prospects for open trade to contribute to the realization of noneconomic objectives are enhanced if states consider the extent to which they have similar goals and cooperate in designing industrial policies to attain them. Cooperation to attenuate negative spillovers and improve the prospects of attaining underlying goals is in the self-interest of states. Arguments that international cooperation on industrial policy is politically infeasible or constitutes an undesirable erosion of sovereignty are misconceived given the significant opportunity costs of uncoordinated unilateral industrial policy interventions.

Suggested Citation

Hoekman, Bernard and Nelson, Douglas R., Industrial Policy and International Cooperation (August 01, 2024). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. 2024_34, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4940313 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4940313

Bernard Hoekman (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

via Boccaccio 121
Florence, Florence 50133
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Economic Research Forum (ERF) ( email )

21 Al-Sad Al-Aaly St.
(P.O. Box: 12311)
Dokki, Cairo
Egypt

Douglas R. Nelson

Tulane University - Department of Economics ( email )

New Orleans, LA 70118
United States

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