Musk's $56 billion: Pay, Incentives, or Rewards?

42 Pages Posted: 3 Sep 2024

See all articles by Jeffrey L. Coles

Jeffrey L. Coles

University of Utah - Department of Finance

Naveen D. Daniel

Drexel University - Department of Finance

Lalitha Naveen

Temple University - Department of Finance

Date Written: August 30, 2024

Abstract

The pay package of Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla, has featured prominently in the news in recent months. Articles related to the size of his pay and the legal battle over the pay package have appeared in numerous media outlets including the Wall Street Journal, Fortune, CBS News, Barron's, PBS News, Reuters, and NPR, to name just a few. The most frequently mentioned headline number for the CEO's compensation is $56 billion. Even a cursory study of the pay package, however, shows that this number is not the CEO's annual pay, which is the usual focus of comparison across CEOs by media and academics. We perform a detailed analysis of Tesla's compensation contract and make three contributions. (i) We find that the compensation design is consistent with sound contracting principles. (ii) We use the Tesla case study to focus attention on three critical elements of CEO compensation: the cost to the company ("annual pay"), the incentives embedded in the pay package to motivate the CEO's future performance, and the estimated maximum rewards to the CEO based on these performance incentives. (iii) We show that the sound-bite figure of $56 billon is not the cost, is not the incentives, and is only loosely related to the estimated maximum rewards to the CEO.

Keywords: G32, G34 Executive Compensation, CEO Pay, CEO Incentives, CEO Rewards, Tesla, Elon Musk, $56 billion

Suggested Citation

Coles, Jeffrey L. and Daniel, Naveen D. and Naveen, Lalitha, Musk's $56 billion: Pay, Incentives, or Rewards? (August 30, 2024). European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 1010/2024, Fox School of Business Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4942066 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4942066

Jeffrey L. Coles

University of Utah - Department of Finance ( email )

David Eccles School of Business
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States
801-587-9093 (Phone)

Naveen D. Daniel

Drexel University - Department of Finance ( email )

LeBow College of Business
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-895-5858 (Phone)
215-895-2955 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://lebow.drexel.edu/Faculty/DanielN

Lalitha Naveen (Contact Author)

Temple University - Department of Finance ( email )

Fox School of Business and Management
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
215-204-6435 (Phone)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
515
Abstract Views
1,449
Rank
112,663
PlumX Metrics