Accountability by Law or by Elites? Experimental Evidence from Brazil's Conviction of Jair Bolsonaro

Abstract

Which mechanisms of democratic accountability successfully turn public opinion against illiberal politicians? Existing research offers two competing theories. The first contends that formal accountability from legal institutions can reduce the popularity of illiberal politicians by prosecuting them for crimes against democracy. The second argues that informal accountability through elite gatekeeping, such as condemnations by co-partisan elites, is needed to diminish illiberal leaders. We test these theories by conducting a survey experiment with 5,800 citizens in Brazil. Respondents were randomly assigned to a treatment about the legal conviction of former president Jair Bolsonaro, a treatment about a co-partisan elite's condemnation of Bolsonaro, or a placebo. We find information about Bolsonaro's legal conviction decreased respondents' intention of voting for Bolsonaro and increased support for banning him, whereas a co-partisan elite's condemnation of Bolsonaro had no effect. Crucially, the legal accountability treatment reduced intention of voting for Bolsonaro most effectively among a small subset of respondents with weak prior attitudes toward Bolsonaro. Troublingly, however, the legal and elite treatments also generated public backlash: Treated respondents became less likely to support fundamental democratic norms and less trusting of the legal or elite messenger of the treatment.

Keywords: Democratic Backsliding, Democratic Accountability, Judicial Politics, Comparative Law, Brazilian Politics, Latin American Politics, Comparative Politics, Law and Politics, Jair Bolsonaro