External Threats and Support for International Security Cooperation

29 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2024

See all articles by Jordan Becker

Jordan Becker

United States Military Academy, Department of Social Science; Free University of Brussels (VUB)-Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Institute for European Studies, Students; Chaire ECODEF - IHEDN; Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire (IRSEM - Institute for Strategic Research)

Matthew DiGiuseppe

Leiden University

Haemin Jee

Stanford University

TongFi Kim

Independent

Date Written: September 06, 2024

Abstract

Are voters more willing to accept external security commitments when international threats increase? While much work in international relations treats threats as key drivers of international behavior, we know little about whether bodies politic change attitudes toward important foreign and security policy questions based on changes in threats, threat perceptions, or even information about threats. We address this question about the relationship between threats and attitudes toward security commitments by fielding a pre-registered survey experiment in Japan. 1 Our experiment explores the micro-foundations of international security cooperation by using information about the probability of war between China and Taiwan to increase the perception of threat among our survey respondents. We find that information about the threat of war does, in fact, significantly increase public support for security cooperation in Japan, regardless of whether the posited cooperation is with Australia, India, South Korea, or the United States. Our findings suggest that while the public may oppose security cooperation in peacetime, there is more support for cooperation when threats are made salient.

Suggested Citation

Becker, Jordan and DiGiuseppe, Matthew and Jee, Haemin and Kim, TongFi, External Threats and Support for International Security Cooperation (September 06, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4949045 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4949045

Jordan Becker (Contact Author)

United States Military Academy, Department of Social Science ( email )

600 Thayer Rd
West Point, NY 10996
United States

Free University of Brussels (VUB)-Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Institute for European Studies, Students ( email )

Ixelles
Belgium

Chaire ECODEF - IHEDN ( email )

Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire (IRSEM - Institute for Strategic Research) ( email )

École Militaire - case 38
1, place Joffre
Paris SP 07, 75007
France

Matthew DiGiuseppe

Leiden University ( email )

Postbus 9500
Leiden, 2300 RA
Netherlands

Haemin Jee

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

TongFi Kim

Independent ( email )

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