How Different Are the Trump Judges?

42 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2024 Last revised: 25 Nov 2024

See all articles by Stephen J. Choi

Stephen J. Choi

New York University School of Law

Mitu Gulati

University of Virginia School of Law

Date Written: September 09, 2024

Abstract

Donald J. Trump's presidency broke the mold in many ways, including how to think about judicial appointments. Unlike other recent presidents, Trump was open about how "his" judges could be depended on to rule in particular ways on key issues important to voters he was courting (e.g., on issues such as guns, religion, and abortion). Other factors such as age and personal loyalty to Trump seemed important criteria. With selection criteria such as these, one might expect that Trump would select from a smaller pool of candidates than other presidents. Given the smaller pool and deviation from traditional norms of picking "good" judges, we were curious about how the Trump judges performed on a basic set of measures of judging. One prediction is that Trumpian constraints on judicial selection produced a different set of judges.  Specifically, one that would underperform compared to sets of judges appointed by other presidents. Using data on active federal appeals court judges from January 1, 2020 to June 30, 2023, we examine data on judges across three different measures: opinion production, influence (measured by citations), and independence or what we refer to as "maverick" behavior. Contrary to the prediction of underperformance, Trump judges outperform other judges, with the very top rankings of judges predominantly filled by Trump judges.

Keywords: Judicial Performance, Judicial Appointments, Donald Trump

Suggested Citation

Choi, Stephen J. and Gulati, Mitu, How Different Are the Trump Judges? (September 09, 2024). Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2024-59, Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2024-27, NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 24-53, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4950475 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4950475

Stephen J. Choi

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

HOME PAGE: http://rb.gy/y6mrqu

Mitu Gulati (Contact Author)

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States

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