Some Anonymous Options Trades Are More Equal than Others

61 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2024

See all articles by Xing Huang

Xing Huang

Washington University in St. Louis - Olin Business School

Philippe Jorion

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business

Christopher Schwarz

University of California, Irvine - Finance Area

Date Written: September 10, 2024

Abstract

We compare retail option trade execution by placing simultaneous market orders across six brokers. Although option trades are all anonymously executed on exchanges and therefore should be treated equally, we find that execution prices vary significantly: the average round-trip execution cost ranges from 0% to 7% across brokers. Wholesalers create differential pricing by not only systematically varying execution methods, but also the pricing within each method. A primary economic driver for differential pricing seems to be payment for order flow (PFOF). However, specialists affiliated with and without PFOF-paying wholesalers provide similar pricing. Our results have market design and disclosures implications.

Keywords: retail trading, execution quality, bid/ask spread, market microstructure, payment for order flow, broker-dealers, options

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G18, G50

Suggested Citation

Huang, Xing and Jorion, Philippe and Schwarz, Christopher, Some Anonymous Options Trades Are More Equal than Others (September 10, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4951825 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4951825

Xing Huang

Washington University in St. Louis - Olin Business School ( email )

Simon Hall 211
Washington University in St. Louis
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

Philippe Jorion

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business ( email )

Campus Drive
Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States
949-824-5245 (Phone)
949-824-8469 (Fax)

Christopher Schwarz (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine - Finance Area ( email )

Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States

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