How Domestic Institutions Shape the Global Tech War

65 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2024 Last revised: 11 Feb 2025

See all articles by Anu Bradford

Anu Bradford

Columbia University - Law School

Matthew C. Waxman

Columbia Law School

Eileen Li

Columbia Law School

Date Written: September 10, 2024

Abstract

The United States, China, and the European Union (EU) are engaged in a national security-driven economic competition over advanced technology. Many scholars and commentators focus on the external dimension of this geopolitical contest; that is, they describe the strategic choices by each actor in terms of geopolitical realities, threat perceptions, and relative power. However, this Article brings to the fore the internal dimension of the global tech war. We argue that each player’s strategy in the tech war is a function of their internal features, including basic constitutional powers, domestic legal institutions, and the relationships between the government and private industry. We show how these internal features enable the United States, China, and the EU to deploy certain strategies while constraining them with respect to other strategies. Comparing key U.S., Chinese, and EU domestic features reveals important insights about their respective strengths and weaknesses in waging the global tech war, and it offers predictive insights about the tech war’s likely future.

Suggested Citation

Bradford, Anu and Waxman, Matthew C. and Li, Eileen, How Domestic Institutions Shape the Global Tech War (September 10, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4954744 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4954744

Anu Bradford (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10009

Matthew C. Waxman

Columbia Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
212-854-0592 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Matthew_Waxman

Eileen Li

Columbia Law School ( email )

435 West 116th St
NEW YORK, NY 10027

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