Do Housing Supply Skeptics Learn? Evidence from Economics and Advocacy Treatments

59 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2024

See all articles by Christopher S. Elmendorf

Christopher S. Elmendorf

University of California, Davis - School of Law

Clayton Nall

Department of Political Science, UC Santa Barbara

Stan Oklobdzija

Tulane University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: September 12, 2024

Abstract

Recent research finds that most people want lower housing prices but, contrary to expert consensus, do not believe that more supply would lower prices. This study tests the effects of four informational interventions on Americans’ beliefs about housing markets and associated policy preferences and political actions (writing to state lawmakers). Several of the interventions significantly and positively affected economic understanding and support for land-use liberaliza- tion, with standardized effect sizes of 0.15 − 0.3. The most impactful treatment—an educational video from an advocacy group—had effects 2-3 times larger than typical economics-information or political-messaging treatments. Learning about housing markets increased support for development among homeowners as much as renters, contrary to the “homevoter hypothesis.” The treatments did not significantly affect the probability of writing to lawmakers, but an off-plan analysis suggests that the advocacy video increased the number of messages asking for more market-rate housing.

Keywords: housing, land use, public opinion, urban economics, experiment, economic expectations, supply shocks

JEL Classification: R31, D83, D84, D90

Suggested Citation

Elmendorf, Christopher S. and Nall, Clayton and Oklobdzija, Stan, Do Housing Supply Skeptics Learn? Evidence from Economics and Advocacy Treatments (September 12, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4955033 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4955033

Christopher S. Elmendorf (Contact Author)

University of California, Davis - School of Law ( email )

Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall
Davis, CA CA 95616-5201
United States
530-752-5756 (Phone)
530-753-5311 (Fax)

Clayton Nall

Department of Political Science, UC Santa Barbara ( email )

Ellison Hall
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States
6178502062 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.nallresearch.com

Stan Oklobdzija

Tulane University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Tulane University
316 Norman Mayer Building
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
686
Abstract Views
3,075
Rank
76,750
PlumX Metrics