The U.S. Presidency: Power and Constraint

27 Annual Review of Political Science 205 (2024)

18 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2024 Last revised: 14 Nov 2024

See all articles by Corey L. Brettschneider

Corey L. Brettschneider

Brown University - Department of Political Science; Fordham University School of Law

Aidan Calvelli

Princeton University, Department of Politics, Students

Date Written: June 18, 2024

Abstract

How much should we fear that a president will break the law to pursue power—then use their office to avoid legal accountability? Political scientists studying the presidency have often overlooked the risk of what we here call a criminal president. Donald Trump’s presidency spotlighted that risk and has begun to shift the field’s focus toward not just presidential power but presidential constraints. We believe this shift should continue. In this review, we aim to set an agenda that makes the danger of a criminal president central to understanding the presidency more broadly. Situating the criminal presidency within wider questions about legal and constitutional constraints on presidential power, we emphasize the unique risks to democracy that a president unbound by law can pose.We call for a greater focus on the legal rules governing the executive branch—especially unitary executive ideas—and the policies needed to hold criminal presidents accountable.

Suggested Citation

Brettschneider, Corey and Calvelli, Aidan, The U.S. Presidency: Power and Constraint (June 18, 2024). 27 Annual Review of Political Science 205 (2024), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4963156

Corey Brettschneider

Brown University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 1844
Providence, RI 02912
United States

Fordham University School of Law ( email )

140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

Aidan Calvelli (Contact Author)

Princeton University, Department of Politics, Students ( email )

Princeton, NJ
United States

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