Dynamic Order Submission Strategies with Competition between a Dealer Market and a Crossing Network

47 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2005

See all articles by Hans Degryse

Hans Degryse

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB)

Mark Van Achter

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Finance

Gunther Wuyts

KU Leuven - University of Leuven

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 14, 2003

Abstract

We present a dynamic microstructure model where a dealer market (DM) and a crossing network (CN) interact. We consider sequentially arriving agents having different valuations for an asset. Agents maximize their profits by either trading at a DM or by submitting an order for (possibly) uncertain execution at a CN. We develop the analysis for three different informational settings: transparency, "complete" opaqueness of all order flow, and "partial" opaqueness (with observable DM trades). We find that a CN and a DM cater for different types of traders. Investors with a high eagerness to trade are more likely to prefer a DM. The introduction of a CN increases overall order flow by attracting traders who would not otherwise submit orders ("order creation"). It also diverts trades from the DM. The transparency and "partial" opaqueness settings generate systematic patterns in order flow. With transparency, the probability of observing a CN order at the same side of the market is smaller after such an order than if it was not. Buy (sell) orders at a CN are also less likely to attract subsequent sell (buy) orders at the DM.

Keywords: Dynamic Order Submission, Alternative Trading Systems, Dealer Market, Crossing Network, Order Flow, Market Microstructure

JEL Classification: G10, G20

Suggested Citation

Degryse, Hans and Van Achter, Mark and Wuyts, Gunther, Dynamic Order Submission Strategies with Competition between a Dealer Market and a Crossing Network (November 14, 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=496683 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.496683

Hans Degryse

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Mark Van Achter

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Finance ( email )

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+31 10 40 82 953 (Phone)
+31 10 40 89 017 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.rsm.nl/mvanachter

Gunther Wuyts (Contact Author)

KU Leuven - University of Leuven ( email )

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics
Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant 3000
Belgium
+3216326731 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/gunther.wuyts

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