Few Bad Apples? Criminal Charges, Political Careers, and Policy Outcomes

65 Pages Posted: 30 Sep 2024 Last revised: 7 Apr 2025

See all articles by Diogo G.C. Britto

Diogo G.C. Britto

Bocconi University

Gianmarco Daniele

University of Milan - Faculty of Law; Bocconi University

Marco Le Moglie

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan; Bocconi University

Paolo Pinotti

Bocconi University

Breno Sampaio

Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE); CLEAN/Bocconi; GAPPE; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: September 26, 2024

Abstract

We study the prevalence and effects of individuals with past criminal charges among politicians in Brazil. Individuals with past criminal charges are twice as likely to both run for office and be elected compared to the general population. This pattern persists across political parties and government levels, even when controlling for a broad set of observable characteristics. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close elections, we demonstrate that the election of mayors with criminal backgrounds leads to higher rates of underweight births and infant mortality, as well as fewer prenatal doctor appointments. Additionally, there is an increase in political patronage, particularly within high rank positions in the health sector, which is consistent with the negative impacts on local public health outcomes. Finally, we show that randomized anti-corruption audits reduce the share of mayors with criminal records but yield short-lived effects, only when conducted in election years.

Keywords: politicians, crime, audits, policies

JEL Classification: K42, J45, P16

Suggested Citation

G.C. Britto, Diogo and Daniele, Gianmarco and Le Moglie, Marco and Pinotti, Paolo and Sampaio, Breno, Few Bad Apples? Criminal Charges, Political Careers, and Policy Outcomes (September 26, 2024). BAFFI CAREFIN Centre Research Paper No. 230, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4969400 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4969400

Diogo G.C. Britto

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Sarfatti, 25
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Gianmarco Daniele

University of Milan - Faculty of Law ( email )

Via Festa del Perdono, 7
20122 Milano
Italy

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Sarfatti 25
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Marco Le Moglie

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan ( email )

Largo Gemelli, 1
Via Necchi 9
Milan, MI 20123
Italy

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Paolo Pinotti (Contact Author)

Bocconi University

Breno Sampaio

Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) ( email )

Cidade Universitária
Recife, Pernambuco 50670-901
Brazil

CLEAN/Bocconi ( email )

GAPPE ( email )

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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