Payout Restrictions and Bank Risk-Shifting

83 Pages Posted: 30 Sep 2024

See all articles by Fulvia Fringuellotti

Fulvia Fringuellotti

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Thomas Kroen

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 01, 2024

Abstract

What are the effects of payout restrictions on bank risk-shifting? To answer this question, we exploit the restriction policies imposed during the Covid-crisis on US banks as a natural experiment. Using a high-frequency differences-in-differences empirical strategy, we show that, when share buybacks are banned and dividends restricted, banks’ equity prices fall while their CDS spreads and bond yields decline. These results indicate that payout restrictions shift risk from debtholders into equityholders. Consistent with a risk-shifting channel, we find that these effects revert once restrictions are lifted. Moreover, banks that are ex-ante more reliant on share buybacks than dividends in their payout policies, decrease risk-taking relative to banks that are ex ante more dividends reliant, with those effects reverting when the restrictions are relaxed. These results indicate that payout and risk-taking choices are complementary and that regulatory payout restrictions endogenously affect bank risk-shifting incentives.

Keywords: banking, payout restrictions, risk-shifting, prudential regulation

JEL Classification: G21, G28, G35, G38

Suggested Citation

Fringuellotti, Fulvia and Kroen, Thomas, Payout Restrictions and Bank Risk-Shifting (September 01, 2024). FRB of New York Staff Report No. 1123, https://doi.org/10.59576/sr.1123, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4969786 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4969786

Fulvia Fringuellotti (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States

Thomas Kroen

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

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