The Legislator as Phronimos (or Anti-phronimos): Virtue and the Legislative Role

Abstract

During the past few decades, virtue jurisprudence scholars have explored the character traits and intellectual capabilities required of practicing lawyers, judges, executive officers, and even the police. As we think about the virtues of those who interpret the law, and the prospects for using the law to inculcate virtue, we also should keep in mind the character traits and cognitive capabilities of those who debate, draft, and vote on laws: legislators. Virtue jurisprudence, with its focus on the character and capabilities of actors within the legal system, provides a valuable normative perspective for evaluating legislators and the legislative role. If legislators ought to be virtuous, which specific intellectual and moral virtues should they possess? What is legislative (or legislator) virtue? Moreover, what is distinctive, if anything, about legislative virtue? How does legislative virtue differ (if at all) from judicial virtue, presidential virtue, or, indeed, the virtue of any ethical human being? This paper is a first step towards engaging with such questions. Proponents of virtue jurisprudence are likely to argue that legislators should possess legislative practical wisdom or phronesis, as well as certain essential moral virtues. As the recent expulsion of George Santos from the House of Representatives demonstrates, a lack of perceived virtue may even disqualify someone from service in Congress altogether.

Keywords: Virtue ethics, Virtue jurisprudence, Congress, George Santos, Aristotle, Phronesis, Phronimos, Practical Wisdom, James Madison