Robust Competitive Ratio for Deterministic Monopoly Pricing

32 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2024

See all articles by Tim van Eck

Tim van Eck

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management

Pieter Kleer

Independent

Johan van Leeuwaarden

Tilburg University

Date Written: September 30, 2024

Abstract

We consider deterministic monopoly pricing when only partial market knowledge is available, specifically when the monopolist only knows summary statistics of the valuation distribution such as mean, dispersion, and maximum valuation. Employing distributionally robust optimization and max-min analysis, we use the competitive ratio (CR) to evaluate pricing performance and compare it with traditional expected revenue metrics. We provide a comprehensive solution to the minimization problem for CR by identifying the worst-case market scenario given the limited information. Additionally, we derive closed-form solutions for optimal pricing under various dispersion measures, including variance and other power moments. Our findings reveal that the worst-case market for CR aligns with that for expected revenue, which challenges the conventional belief that CR restricts the adversary’s ability to create extreme scenarios. Through novel proof techniques tailored to CR, we also show how dispersion and maximum valuation impact optimal deterministic pricing. Our results offer valuable insights for adjusting prices effectively and avoiding unrealistic worst-case scenarios, thus leading to more robust and resilient pricing strategies. In particular, setting a maximum valuation introduces a new high-pricing strategy and proves a key factor in unlocking the potential for more profitable (not overly conservative) pricing schemes. 

Suggested Citation

van Eck, Tim and Kleer, Pieter and van Leeuwaarden, Johan, Robust Competitive Ratio for Deterministic Monopoly Pricing (September 30, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4972767 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4972767

Tim Van Eck (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Pieter Kleer

Independent ( email )

Johan Van Leeuwaarden

Tilburg University ( email )

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