Voluntary Disclosure and the Internal Information Environment of the Firm

Abstract

This study explores how a firm's internal information environment affects a manager's decision to voluntarily disclose information to investors. It presents a model where the probability that a manager has information depends on whether the information is favorable or unfavorable. In the model, an internal information environment is defined as conservative (aggressive) if it is more (less) likely to provide information about negative outcomes to a manager. The study shows that conservative internal information environments decrease voluntary disclosure. Additionally, in conservative (aggressive) internal information environments, an increase in information asymmetry between a manager and investors leads to less (more) voluntary disclosure. This finding provides insight into how the firm's internal and external information environments interact to determine the extent of voluntary disclosure, and is thus of empirical relevance.

Keywords: Voluntary Disclosure, Financial Reporting, Internal Information Environment, Management Accounting, Conservatism

JEL Classification: C72, D21, D53, D82, D83, M41