10 years of Banking Union Case-Law: How Did CJEU Judgments Shape Supervision and Resolution Practice in the Banking Union?

88 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2024

See all articles by Christos Gortsos

Christos Gortsos

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; EUSFIL Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence

Date Written: October 07, 2024

Abstract

This study analyses in a systematic way (albeit on a selective basis) the evolution of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in relation to the two pillars of the Banking Union in force, namely the Single Supervisory and the Single Resolution Mechanisms, from their full operationalisation in 2014 and 2015, respectively, up to the beginning of September 2024.

Keywords: EU Courts, General Court, European Central Bank, Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation, Single Resolution Board, Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation, national competent authorities, national resolution authorities, specific tasks, withdrawal of banking licenses, qualifying holdings, resolution conditions, failing or likely to fail (FOLTF), supervisory assessments, public interest assessment, resolution scheme, resolution cases, no-resolution cases, valuation for the purposes of resolution, no creditor worse off (NCWO) principle, complex economic and technical assessments, discretionary powers, proportionality, marginal judicial review

JEL Classification: E50, E53, E58, G01, G21, G28, G33, K23, K33, N20, N24

Suggested Citation

Gortsos, Christos, 10 years of Banking Union Case-Law: How Did CJEU Judgments Shape Supervision and Resolution Practice in the Banking Union? (October 07, 2024). European Banking Institute Working Paper Series No. 182, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4977650 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4977650

Christos Gortsos (Contact Author)

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens ( email )

EUSFIL Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence ( email )

Italy

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