Optimal Enfranchisement

32 Pages Posted: 8 Oct 2024

Abstract

We study the optimal voting franchise for a decision which affects different persons with different intensities. When the agents' opinions are ex ante permutation invariant, we show that it is optimal to restrict the franchise to the agents with the higher stakes, with a smaller franchise when stakes are more concentrated. When they are i.i.d. (all voters favour Yes independently with the same probability p), we further show that two forces are at work: on the one hand, the imperative to restrict voting rights to the most affected; on the other, when and only when p ≠ 1/2, the Condorcet jury effect according to which allowing more voters to participate increases the probability of taking the right decision. This helps shed light on the problem in large populations.

Keywords: voting, democracy, enfranchisement, preference intensity

Suggested Citation

Lojkine, Ulysse and Fleurbaey, Marc, Optimal Enfranchisement. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4979592 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4979592

Ulysse Lojkine (Contact Author)

Sciences Po ( email )

28 Rue des Saint-Peres
Paris, Paris 75006
France

Marc Fleurbaey

Paris School of Economics ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

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