Smuggling Humans: A Theory of Debt-Financed Migration

IZA Discussion Paper No. 1025

30 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2004

See all articles by Guido Friebel

Guido Friebel

Goethe University Frankfurt; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Sergei Guriev

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2004

Abstract

We introduce financial constraints in a theoretical analysis of illegal immigration. Intermediaries finance the migration costs of wealth-constrained migrants, who enter temporary servitude contracts to pay back the debt. These debt/labor contracts are more easily enforceable in the illegal than in the legal sector of the host country. Hence, when moving from the illegal to the legal sector becomes more costly, for instance, because of stricter deportation policies, fewer immigrants default on debt. This reduces the risks for intermediaries, who are then more willing to finance illegal migration. Stricter deportation policies may thus increase rather than decrease the ex ante flow of illegal migrants. We also show that stricter deportation policies worsen the skill composition of immigrants. While stricter border controls decrease overall immigration, they may also result in an increase of debt-financed migration.

Keywords: Illegal migration, wealth constraints, indentured servitude, financial contracting

JEL Classification: O15, O17, J61, N21

Suggested Citation

Friebel, Guido and Guriev, Sergei, Smuggling Humans: A Theory of Debt-Financed Migration (February 2004). IZA Discussion Paper No. 1025, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=498522 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.498522

Guido Friebel

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Sergei Guriev (Contact Author)

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) ( email )

27 rue Saint-Guillaume
Paris Cedex 07, 75337
France

HOME PAGE: http://econ.sciences-po.fr/staff/sergei-guriev

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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