Recommendations to Strengthen the US Government's Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogen Framework and Dual Use Research of Concern Policies

Abstract

The purpose of this document is to provide recommendations to the US Government (USG) and the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity (NSABB) as revisions are being developed regarding oversight of enhanced potential pandemic pathogen (ePPP) research and dual-use research more broadly. Research in the life sciences, especially research with microbial agents, addresses major challenges in medicine, public health, and the environment, and offers important benefits. However, life science research can also pose risks, particularly in the realm of enhancing potential pandemic pathogens (PPP) and other dual-use challenges. COVID-19 has shown the global impact of a highly transmissible virus that causes mortality and morbidity. Experiments that create the possibility of initiating such a pandemic require rigorous assessment. Increased access to the ability to create and engineer pathogens, driven partly by continued advancements in general purpose tools and methods, presents new challenges for carefully governing this work.

Keywords: health security, biosecurity, dual-use, dual-use research of concern, enhanced pandemic pathogen