Legality and Commitment

Abstract

Many philosophers believe there is no general, content-independent duty to obey the law. Yet at least some (and perhaps many) citizens and officials believe law makes a real difference--independently of its content and of prudential considerations--regarding what they should do. This paper offers an argument that vindicates the latter belief, even if skeptics are right in thinking that law cannot generate a general duty to obey. Under this argument, whether law makes a real practical difference, independently of its content and of the sanctions threatened for its violation, can turn on whether individuals have adopted a commitment to law. The paper provides an account of such commitments and their impact on reasons for action. As I argue, the fact that a legal system complies with the demands of the rule of law is one important reason why individuals ought to, or at least might, adopt such a commitment. Compliance with the rule of law is thus not normatively irrelevant, even if it does not directly ground a moral duty to obey.