Race to Rebalance: Global Supply Chains and Labor Market Regulation

71 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2024 Last revised: 20 Feb 2025

See all articles by Xiaoxue Hu

Xiaoxue Hu

Xiamen University - Department of Finance

Dongxu Li

Xiamen University - Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE)

Rose C. Liao

Rutgers University, Newark, School of Business-Newark, Department of Finance & Economics

Angie Low

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University

Carrie H. Pan

Santa Clara University - Department of Finance

Date Written: September 27, 2024

Abstract

Exploiting 18 million freight shipment records, we show that U.S. firms increase import 6% more from countries that strengthen labor laws through mandatory workforce policy (MWP) regulations, especially from new suppliers. While firms importing from MWP countries experienced increasing operating costs, they also receive favorable employmentcondition evaluations and have fewer negative social issues reported. Our results are consistent with firms responding to employee preferences: the import increase from MWP countries is more pronounced when majority of firms’ employees are in Democratic states, and in industries with high employee bargaining power. Our results are robust to alternative channels and have important policy implications.

Keywords: Import, Global Supply Chains, Labor Policy, Employee preference, Corporate social responsibility JEL Codes: F16, G34, F23, J08

JEL Classification: F16; G34; F23; J08

Suggested Citation

Hu, Xiaoxue and Li, Dongxu and Liao, Rose C. and Low, Angie and Pan, Carrie H., Race to Rebalance: Global Supply Chains and Labor Market Regulation
(September 27, 2024). Nanyang Business School Research Paper No. 24-28, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4993956 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4993956

Xiaoxue Hu

Xiamen University - Department of Finance ( email )

Xiamen, Fujian 361005
China

Dongxu Li (Contact Author)

Xiamen University - Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE) ( email )

B-114, Economics Building
Xiamen, Fujian 361005
China

Rose C. Liao

Rutgers University, Newark, School of Business-Newark, Department of Finance & Economics ( email )

1 Washington Park
Newark, NJ 07102
United States

Angie Low

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University ( email )

Singapore, 639798
Singapore

Carrie H. Pan

Santa Clara University - Department of Finance ( email )

Santa Clara, CA 95053
United States
(408)5517188 (Phone)

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