The effect of patent scope on declaration of standard essential patents - Evidence from the European Telecommunications Standards

Abstract

Given the growing importance of technology standards and their overall effect on inventive activity (e.g., division of innovative labor, follow-on innovation), studies have examined various aspects of technology standards, including the efficiency of standard setting organizations, innovation outcomes, legal cases involving standard essential patents, and strategic behaviors of inventors. However, systematic investigation into how inventor and invention characteristics influence strategic behaviors within standard setting organizations (SSOs) is scarce. In this study, we examine the extent to which inventors leverage the scope of their patents to behave strategically when deciding which patents to declare standard essential and explore how the extent of such behaviors vary across specific inventor and invention characteristics. We find that inventors are more likely to declare a broad patent standard essential than a narrow patent. We also find evidence that the relationship is stronger for low levels of complementary assets as well as when inventions are high quality and novel.