In Brussels We Trust? Exploring Corporate Resistance in Platform Regulation

Law, Innovation and Technology, Volume 17, No. 2

27 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2024

See all articles by Linda Weigl

Linda Weigl

University of Amsterdam - Institute for Information Law (IViR)

Aleksandra Guzik

University of Amsterdam - University of Amsterdam Faculty of Law

Date Written: October 29, 2024

Abstract

Can European regulators be trusted with the enforcement of the new Digital Services Act package? Recent developments show that designated companies are increasingly pursuing legal action against EU institutions. In a comparative analysis of litigation in the context of the GDPR, the DMA and the DSA, we find that the accumulation of digital legislation over time provides some explanatory potential for this legal obstructionism. Moreover, compared to the GDPR, the DMA and the DSA have a stronger impact on platforms' business models. While GDPR provisions impose rules on obtaining a lawful basis for data processing on all data processing entities, they do not fundamentally alter how a subset of designated platforms generate profit. Although the Commission stands steadfast in its enforcement actions, the rise in legal disputes could be seen as a warning sign, questioning the platforms' true willingness to adhere and requiring the Commission to be particularly vigilant.

Keywords: Digital Services Act, Digital Markets Act, GDPR, platform regulation, enforcement, Brussels Effect, litigation

Suggested Citation

Weigl, Linda and Guzik, Aleksandra, In Brussels We Trust? Exploring Corporate Resistance in Platform Regulation (October 29, 2024). Law, Innovation and Technology, Volume 17, No. 2, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5002874 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5002874

Linda Weigl (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Institute for Information Law (IViR) ( email )

Aleksandra Guzik

University of Amsterdam - University of Amsterdam Faculty of Law ( email )

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
190
Abstract Views
501
Rank
340,668
PlumX Metrics