Two Wrongs Can Sometimes Make a Right: The Environmental Benefits of Market Power in Oil

42 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 2024 Last revised: 18 Nov 2024

See all articles by John Asker

John Asker

UCLA

Allan Collard-Wexler

Duke University

Charlotte De Canniere

KU Leuven

Jan De Loecker

KU Leuven; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Christopher R. Knittel

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: November 2024

Abstract

Market power reduces equilibrium quantities and distorts production, typically causing welfare losses. However, as Buchanan (1969) noted, market power may mitigate overproduction from negative externalities. This paper examines this in the global oil market, where OPEC’s market power affects oil production and carbon intensity. We estimate that from 1970 to 2021, OPEC’s market power reduced emissions by over 67 GtCO2, equating to $4,073 billion in climate damages and 17.8% of the carbon budget needed for the 1.5◦ C Paris Agreement target. This environmental benefit outweighs the welfare loss from distorted production allocation.

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Suggested Citation

Asker, John William and Collard-Wexler, Allan and De Canniere, Charlotte and De Loecker, Jan and Knittel, Christopher R., Two Wrongs Can Sometimes Make a Right: The Environmental Benefits of Market Power in Oil (November 2024). NBER Working Paper No. w33115, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5008678

John William Asker (Contact Author)

UCLA ( email )

8283 Bunche Hall
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
United States

Allan Collard-Wexler

Duke University ( email )

100 Fuqua Drive
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Charlotte De Canniere

KU Leuven ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Leuven, 3000
Belgium

Jan De Loecker

KU Leuven ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant 3000
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Christopher R. Knittel

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) ( email )

One Amherst Street, E40-279
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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