Experiments on Unemployment Benefit Sanctions and Job Search Behavior

31 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2004

See all articles by Jan Boone

Jan Boone

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); TILEC

Abdolkarim Sadrieh

University of Magdeburg

Jan C. van Ours

Tilburg University - Department of Economics; University of Melbourne - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2004

Abstract

This paper presents the results of an experimental study on unemployment benefit sanctions. The experimental set-up allows us to distinguish between the effect of benefit sanctions once they are imposed (the ex post effect) and the effect that unemployed want to avoid getting a benefit sanction imposed (the ex ante effect). We find that both effects matter. Moreover, the ex ante effect turns out to be substantial and bigger than the ex post effect. Benefit sanctions stimulate the outflow from unemployment.

Keywords: experiments, unemployment benefits, sanctions, job search

JEL Classification: C91, J64, J65

Suggested Citation

Boone, Jan and Sadrieh, Abdolkarim and van Ours, Jan C., Experiments on Unemployment Benefit Sanctions and Job Search Behavior (January 2004). IZA Discussion Paper No. 1000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=500905

Jan Boone

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2399 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

TILEC ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Abdolkarim Sadrieh

University of Magdeburg ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Management
Postbox 4120
39016 Magdeburg
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de

Jan C. Van Ours (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2880 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

University of Melbourne - Department of Economics ( email )

Melbourne, 3010
Australia

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