State-Evading Solutions to Violence: Organized Crime and Governance in Indigenous Mexico

81 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2024

See all articles by Beatriz Magaloni

Beatriz Magaloni

Stanford University - Department of Political Science

Sarah Thompson

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Kristóf Gosztonyi

Universität Osnabrück

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 10, 2021

Abstract

The monopoly of violence in the hands of the state is conceived as the principal vehicle to generate order. A problem with this vision is that parts of the state and its law enforcement apparatus often become extensions of criminality rather than solutions to it. We argue that one solution to this dilemma is to "opt out from the state." Using a multi-method strategy combining extensive qualitative research, quasi-experimental statistical analyses, and survey data, the paper demonstrates that indigenous communities in Mexico are better able to escape predatory criminal rule when they are legally allowed to carve a space of autonomy from the state through the institution of "usos y costumbres." We demonstrate that these municipalities are more immune to violence than similar localities where regular police forces and local judiciaries are in charge of law enforcement and where mayors are elected through multiparty elections rather than customary practices.

Suggested Citation

Magaloni, Beatriz and Thompson, Sarah and Gosztonyi, Kristóf, State-Evading Solutions to Violence: Organized Crime and Governance in Indigenous Mexico (September 10, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5012662 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5012662

Beatriz Magaloni (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-724-7481 (Phone)

Sarah Thompson

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Kristóf Gosztonyi

Universität Osnabrück ( email )

Neuer Graben
Osnabrück, 49074
Germany

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