Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements are Unstable

UC Berkeley Competition Policy Center Working Paper No. CPC02-27

23 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2004

See all articles by Federico Echenique

Federico Echenique

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Aaron S. Edlin

University of California at Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2002

Abstract

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria - equilibria that are not in pure strategies - are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

Keywords: Mmixed-strategy equilibrium, learning, supermodular games, strategic complementarities, equilibrium selection

JEL Classification: C72, C73

Suggested Citation

Echenique, Federico and Edlin, Aaron S., Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements are Unstable (May 2002). UC Berkeley Competition Policy Center Working Paper No. CPC02-27. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=501543 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.501543

Federico Echenique (Contact Author)

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

313 Baxter Hall
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

Aaron S. Edlin

University of California at Berkeley ( email )

Dept of Economics 549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-4719 (Phone)
510-643-0413 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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