Farm-Bloc Federalism: The Rise, Fall (and Rise Again?) of a Constitutional Coalition

Abstract

For a century, between 1832 and 1932, constitutional federalism was sustained primarily by political parties and their partisan platforms and only secondarily by courts and judicial review. A “farm bloc” of politicians from southern and western states played a critical role in this system of partisan popular constitutionalism. Between 1832 and 1860, politicians from the Democratic Party elected primarily from farm bloc states erected a system of constitutional federalism to counteract the perceived power of transportation and banking corporations. Enforced through rigorous adherence to party platforms, that system’s constitutional foundation assisted Democrats in fending off coalition-splitting efforts by Whigs and Republicans while simultaneously enabling coalition partners with rival interests to get along.

Uniting a partisan coalition with principles of federalism, however, proved to be elusive between the Civil War and the New Deal. Farm bloc federalism could not reconcile the southern and western wings of the Democratic Party over slavery, despite Stephen Douglas’ best efforts to craft a schism-mending constitutional theory of popular sovereignty. After the Civil War, the Democratic Party abandoned farm bloc federalism in favor of an ethnocultural federalism resistant to the nationalization of Protestant reforms like the prohibition of saloons or the regulation of schooling. Designed to unite non-Protestant immigrant communities in northern cities with southern white supremacists, ethnocultural federalism had little appeal for westerners. It accordingly collapsed in the face of William Jennings Bryan’s nationalistic program of robust federal control over corporations and aid to farmers. Under Bryan’s influence, southern politicians embraced progressive reforms that alienated non-Protestant immigrant politicians in northern cities, leaving southern white supremacists vulnerable to anti-lynching legislation after World War I. In response, western politicians like William Borah of Idaho attempted but ultimately failed to create a new farm bloc linking the South and West that was based on a robust “state action” limit on the federal government’s regulation of private violence.

The history of farm bloc federalism holds more than historical interest today. Donald Trump has proposed to revive farm-bloc federalism by decentralizing disputes about abortion. Now that the Republicans have won control of the federal government, their adherence to this federalism plank of the 2024 GOP platform will be tested. The history of farm bloc federalism suggests that partisan compromise through federalism is difficult to achieve. Using constitutional federalism to solidify a partisan alliance requires rule simplicity, compromise of moral disagreement, accommodation of divergent interests, and nexus to legal sources like text and precedent. These factors do not combine easily into a coherent package. The article concludes with some speculation about the Republican Party’s capacity to manage such a feat of constitutional partisan engineering.

Keywords: Constitutional Law, Legal History, Federalism, Political Parties