Firms' Supply Chain Adaptation to Carbon Taxes

68 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2024

See all articles by Pierre Coster

Pierre Coster

USC Dornsife INET, Department of Economics, USC

Isabelle Mejean

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) - Department of Economics

Julian di Giovanni

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: November 01, 2024

Abstract

This paper investigates how firms adapt their sourcing of clean and dirty inputs in response to changes in climate policy. We use information from the European Union's Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to create a new classification of clean and dirty products based on whether they are subject to a domestic or a border carbon tax. We then combine this dataset with French firms' product-level import data over 2000-2019 and estimate that firms' propensity to import dirty inputs from non-EU countries increased in the 2010s, reflecting carbon leakage. A heterogeneous firm model is then used to quantify the impact of changes in firms' sourcing of clean and dirty inputs given the implementation of a carbon tax and a carbon tariff. The simulated ETS carbon tax scenario is able to match leakage observed in the data and leads to a higher price level and a modest decline in emissions. The scenario that further includes the CBAM carbon tariff reverses carbon leakage at the cost of an additional rise in prices. Overall, household welfare declines because the higher costs associated with the carbon policies outweigh the benefits of reduced emissions.

Keywords: supply chain adaptation, carbon tax, carbon tariffs, carbon leakage, firm sourcing

JEL Classification: F14, F18, F64, H23, Q56

Suggested Citation

Coster, Pierre and Mejean, Isabelle and di Giovanni, Julian, Firms' Supply Chain Adaptation to Carbon Taxes (November 01, 2024). FRB of New York Staff Report No. 1136, https://doi.org/10.59576/sr.1136, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5021379 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5021379

Pierre Coster

USC Dornsife INET, Department of Economics, USC ( email )

Isabelle Mejean

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) - Department of Economics ( email )

28, rue des Saints peres
Paris, 75007
France

Julian Di Giovanni (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States

HOME PAGE: http://julian.digiovanni.ca

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://julian.digiovanni.ca

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