Calibrating Agnosticism: Theories of Bureaucratic Motivation in Administrative Law
46 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2024 Last revised: 20 Nov 2024
Date Written: August 01, 2024
Abstract
In making sense of administrative law, one cannot avoid reliance on general descriptions—theories—regarding how bureaucracy works, how officials make decisions and upon what basis. It matters on which among the wide array of such theories lawmakers and scholars arrive, both for effective law, and to clarify one’s normative commitments to reform or preserve the law. Even modest steps towards better theories of administrative behavior can be of societal importance, but theory choice is inherently difficult. This article considers the extent to which such theories of bureaucratic motivation explain administrative decisions and, in the process, demonstrates a way to bridge theoretical discussions by looking to empirical bureaucratic actions.
Drawing on examples of administrative decisions to privatize environmental analysis under the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act, this article considers the plausibility of explanations provided by two prominent rival theories, the State Trustee and Public Choice theories of bureaucratic motivation. Rather than seeking a one-shot conclusion as to the descriptive accuracy or falsity of these theories, the article draws on empirical examples to improve upon prior beliefs and to add greater weight to the likelihood of one or other explanation. Applying this approach, the article finds that the evidence “picks out” the Public Choice explanation relative to its rival. Beyond particular decisions, the article offers a first word—self-consciously not the last—on the relative plausibility of two prominent theories of bureaucratic motivation and an approach to bridging disparate theoretical conversations regarding administrative practice.
Keywords: administrative law, discretion, bureaucratic motivation, Public Choice theory
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