Interest Rate Caps, Corporate Lending, and Bank Market Power: Evidence from Bangladesh

Abstract

How does market power in the corporate banking sector influence the effects of interest rate cap policies on credit allocation? We study this question using administrative credit registry data in Bangladesh, where the Central Bank capped the interest rate on corporate loans at 13% in 2009, relative to a pre-reform average interest rate of 14.5%. We apply a difference-in-differences design with variation in pre-regulation, branch-level interest rates as an exposure measure and find that a one percentage point cap-induced drop in rates increased lending amounts by 30% over the two years of the cap regime. This increase in lending is not driven by banks’ costs to supplying credit, as proxied by the riskiness of the borrower pool or deposit funding costs. Our results point to substantial credit under-provision due to banks’ market power in an emerging markets context, even in the presence of relationship lending.

Keywords: corporate banking, interest rate caps, relationship lending, market power, regulation, emerging markets finance

JEL Classification: D43, G21, G28, L51, O16