Delisting Costs and Corporate Mobility in Europe

44 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2024 Last revised: 27 Nov 2024

See all articles by Jonathan Chan

Jonathan Chan

McGill University - Faculty of Law

Carsten Gerner-Beuerle

University College London - Faculty of Laws; University of Notre Dame - Notre Dame Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: November 25, 2024

Abstract

There is considerable variation among capital markets in the frequency of voluntary and involuntary delistings, which has been attributed by some commentators to differences in the regulatory framework governing delisting decisions. However, there have been few systematic attempts to map these differences across legal systems and quantify the regulatory costs of delistings. This article analyses delisting regimes of major EU jurisdictions and several non-EU countries and develops indices that capture delisting costs. It shows that the delisting regimes of some EU Member States are prohibitively costly. The article then considers whether such delisting regimes are consistent with EU free movement rights. It concludes by critically evaluating a menu of policy options to ensure that delisting rules facilitate corporate mobility and an efficient allocation of capital in the EU. 

Keywords: Delistings, capital allocation, corporate mobility, free movement of capital

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

Chan, Jonathan and Gerner-Beuerle, Carsten, Delisting Costs and Corporate Mobility in Europe (November 25, 2024). European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper No. 813/2024, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5033918 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5033918

Jonathan Chan

McGill University - Faculty of Law ( email )

3644 Peel Street
Montreal H3A 1W9, Quebec H3A 1W9
Canada

Carsten Gerner-Beuerle (Contact Author)

University College London - Faculty of Laws ( email )

Bentham House
4-8 Endsleigh Gardens
London, WC1E OEG
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/people/carsten-gerner-beuerle

University of Notre Dame - Notre Dame Law School ( email )

Eck Hall of Law
Notre Dame, IN 46556
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://https://ecgi.global/users/carsten-gerner-beuerle

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
108
Abstract Views
213
Rank
510,074
PlumX Metrics