Antitrust, Private Equity & Venture Capital

Research Handbook on the Structure of Private Equity and Venture Capital (forthcoming)

Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2024-46

27 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2024

See all articles by Matthew Wansley

Matthew Wansley

Yeshiva University - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Samuel Weinstein

Yeshiva University - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Date Written: December 04, 2024

Abstract

The private equity and venture capital markets used to be backwaters of antitrust. PE and VC firms were seen as benign or even pro-competitive forces. But in recent years, enforcers and scholars have started to scrutinize PE acquisitions, PE club deals, and PE managers who serve on interlocking directorates. And at the same time, some have argued that incumbent tech companies are acquiring venture-backed startups to choke off nascent competitors. In this Chapter, we explore how PE and VC firms, their portfolio companies, and the companies that acquire their portfolio companies might harm competition. And we consider proposals to reform antitrust law in response. Our goal is to provide context to these debates and identify open questions for future research.

Keywords: antitrust, venture capital, private equity

JEL Classification: K21

Suggested Citation

Wansley, Matthew and Weinstein, Samuel, Antitrust, Private Equity & Venture Capital (December 04, 2024). Research Handbook on the Structure of Private Equity and Venture Capital (forthcoming), Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2024-46, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5044643 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5044643

Matthew Wansley (Contact Author)

Yeshiva University - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law ( email )

55 Fifth Ave.
New York, NY 10003
United States

Samuel Weinstein

Yeshiva University - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law ( email )

55 Fifth Ave.
New York, NY 10003
United States

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