Risk Retention in the European Securitization Market: Skimmed by the Skin-in-The-Game Methods?

48 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2024

See all articles by Vivian van Breemen

Vivian van Breemen

De Nederlandsche Bank

Claudia Schwarz

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Dennis Vink

Nyenrode Business University

Frank J. Fabozzi

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School

Abstract

We empirically investigated the impact of regulatory risk retention methods on credit ratings and pricing at issuance using a sample of European securitization tranches issued from 2011-2021. European regulation assumes that all risk retention methods homogenously align incentives and interests between originators and investors. We investigated the impact of these methods on the pricing of securitization tranches. We found that investors adjust the risk premium at issuance for tranches based on different risk retention methods. We also found that credit ratings (discrepancy) differed depending on the risk retention method. Finally, we gained a deeper insight into the risk retention methods chosen over time. We concluded that originators consider deal complexity and capital relief characteristics when selecting a specific method.

Keywords: risk retention rule, primary issuance spread, credit ratings

Suggested Citation

van Breemen, Vivian and Schwarz, Claudia and Vink, Dennis and Fabozzi, Frank J., Risk Retention in the European Securitization Market: Skimmed by the Skin-in-The-Game Methods?. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5045996 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5045996

Vivian Van Breemen (Contact Author)

De Nederlandsche Bank ( email )

PO Box 98
1000 AB Amsterdam
Amsterdam, 1000 AB
Netherlands

Claudia Schwarz

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Dennis Vink

Nyenrode Business University ( email )

Straatweg 25
P.O. Box 130
Breukelen, 3620 AC
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.dennisvink.nl

Frank J. Fabozzi

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School ( email )

100 International Drive
Baltimore, MD 21202
United States

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