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Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict

WZB, Markets and Political Economy Working Paper No. SP II 2003-28

21 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2004  

Helmut Bester

Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Date Written: December 2003

Abstract

Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target.

Keywords: Timing of conflict, war, easy targets

JEL Classification: B31, D74, H77

Suggested Citation

Bester, Helmut and Konrad, Kai A., Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict (December 2003). WZB, Markets and Political Economy Working Paper No. SP II 2003-28. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=505002 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.505002

Helmut Bester

Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics ( email )

Boltzmannstr. 20
Berlin 14195, 14195
Germany
+49 30 838 55257 (Phone)
+49 30 838 54142 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
Berlin, 10785
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wzb.eu/mp/fff/people/kai_konrad.en.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

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