Bounded Rationality in Ride-Sourcing Drivers' Dwelling at Transportation Terminals: A Behavioral Queueing Analysis
46 Pages Posted: 29 Jan 2025
Date Written: November 27, 2024
Abstract
This paper examines the boundedly rational behavior of ride-sourcing drivers at transportation terminals through the lens of behavioral queueing theory. By integrating behavioral concepts such as mental accounting, risk aversion, and endowment effects, we establish a theoretical model of idle drivers' queueing decisions and formulate hypotheses to identify drivers' bounded rationality. Empirical analysis using a dataset from Tianjin, China reveals that drivers are influenced by sunk costs through mental accounting, leading them to extended waits in the queue. We also find that drivers are risk-averse in the time loss domain and are more likely to leave the queue when they are not sequentially matched, as opposed to being matched in FIFO order. Additionally, service cancellations are found to trigger the endowment effect among drivers, strengthening their willingness to stay in the queue. Our findings highlight the importance of understanding these behavioral factors to improve queue management and operational efficiency in ride-sourcing systems. Policy recommendations include designing incentives for driver relocation to mitigate the driver oversupply induced by the sunk cost effect and limit customers' ability to cancel orders at terminals to counteract the negative effects of service cancellations.
Keywords: Ride-sourcing, Driver behavior, Bounded rationality, Behavioral queueing theory, Supply management
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