The Outsized Role of Tax Havens in Mergers and Acquisitions

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See all articles by Jake Smith

Jake Smith

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

Jean-Marie Meier

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management; University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department

Date Written: June 30, 2020

Abstract

Tax havens are used for tax minimization. Whether tax havens affect corporate control in the form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) or are merely used as conduits between host and destination countries of (greenfield) foreign direct investment and portfolio investment is an open question. We provide new stylized facts through the first comprehensive analysis of cross-border, tax-haven mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Using novel tax residence data, we investigate 13,318 such transactions from 1990 to 2017, totaling $4.2 trillion in deal value, or 29% of cross-border M&A volume. $2.4 of the $4.2 trillion exceeds our prediction based on a gravity model with economic fundamentals. Small havens such as Bermuda alone make up $1.1 trillion or 8% of cross-border M&A volume. For identification, we use a change in US tax law in 2004.

Keywords: Capital flows, cross-border mergers and acquisitions, tax havens

JEL Classification: F21, G34, H73

Suggested Citation

Smith, Jake and Meier, Jean-Marie, The Outsized Role of Tax Havens in Mergers and Acquisitions (June 30, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

Jake Smith (Contact Author)

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ( email )

1961 Stout Street
Suite 1700
Denver, CO 80294
United States

Jean-Marie Meier

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )

Jindal School of Management
800 W. Campbell Road
Richardson, TX 75080
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.jean-mariemeier.com/

University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )

The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.jean-mariemeier.com

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