Cross-border spillover effects of corporate taxes

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See all articles by Pietro Bonetti

Pietro Bonetti

University of Navarra, IESE Business School

Martin Jacob

University of Navarra, IESE Business School

Gaizka Ormazabal

University of Navarra, IESE Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: December 27, 2024

Abstract

This paper explores how corporate taxes can result in crosscountry spillover effects along international supply chains. Rooted in the theory of tax incidence, suppliers (customers) try to pass their corporate tax burden onto foreign customers (suppliers) through higher (lower) prices. This reduces foreign firms' profits and, thereby, can lead to lower investments at the level of the customer (supplier). Using a rich data set on millions of supplier-customer links for over 18,000 publicly traded firms and exploiting corporate tax rate variation in 54 countries over the period 2010-2022 in a shift-share design, we find evidence supporting this notion. Corporate taxes of suppliers or customers reduce investments of connected foreign firms along the supply chain. This investment-spillover effect is stronger when firms have less bargaining power or when they operate in more competitive markets. Moreover, we show that higher suppliers' and customers' taxes reduce connected firms' profitability and margins. We also show that foreign firms respond to suppliers' or customers' taxes by adjusting the global supplier-customer network. Overall, our results show that corporate taxes can result in adverse cross-border spillover effects when firms are connected via the supply chain.

Keywords: supply-chain links, spillover effects, tax incidence, corporate tax

Suggested Citation

Bonetti, Pietro and Jacob, Martin and Ormazabal, Gaizka, Cross-border spillover effects of corporate taxes (December 27, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

Pietro Bonetti

University of Navarra, IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Martin Jacob (Contact Author)

University of Navarra, IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Gaizka Ormazabal

University of Navarra, IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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