Do CEOs Invest in Corporate Social Responsibility for Personal Insurance Purposes?

57 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2025

See all articles by Peter (Seung Hwan) Oh

Peter (Seung Hwan) Oh

McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management

Patrick W. Ryu

The University of Manchester - Alliance Manchester Business School

Jingjing Zhang

McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management

Joonil Lee

Kyung Hee University

Date Written: December 30, 2024

Abstract

We ask whether CEOs invest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) for personal insurance-like protection. To address this question, we examine the setting of CEO clawback provisions, which are compensation contract provisions that enable boards of directors to recoup CEO compensation upon financial restatements or misconduct. Clawbacks increase the individual-level risk of recoupment on CEOs’ wealth, which in turn increases incentives for CEOs to incur insurance-like protection. We find that firms led by CEOs with clawback provisions take on more CSR activities. The effect is stronger when CEOs perceive insurance-like benefits of CSR to be higher – when corporate governance is weaker, future restatements are more likely, the amount of compensation at stake is larger, the CEO is less confident, and board directors have more discretion over clawback enforcement. We also find that CSR activities conducted under this motive may not be optimal for firm value. Our study contributes to the theory on the risk-management role of CSR and research on how CEO characteristics and incentives affect their decision to engage in CSR. While prior research on the risk-management role of CSR has predominantly focused on insurance-like benefits at the firm-level, there has been scant evidence on whether such benefits can act as a motivation for CEOs to actively engage in CSR to incur these benefits for themselves at the individual CEO-level. Furthermore, many studies have explored the CEO related antecedents of CSR activities, but to our knowledge we are one of the first to bring the risk-management role of CSR to the CEOs’ individual-level as an incentive to engage in CSR, shedding light on how the incentives and contractual conditions of CEOs can affect their propensity to engage in CSR activities, even as unintended consequences.

Keywords: corporate social responsibility, insurance-like benefit, executive compensation clawback provisions, corporate governance, stakeholder relations

Suggested Citation

Oh, Peter (Seung Hwan) and Ryu, Patrick W. and Zhang, Jingjing and Lee, Joonil, Do CEOs Invest in Corporate Social Responsibility for Personal Insurance Purposes? (December 30, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5077458 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5077458

Peter (Seung Hwan) Oh (Contact Author)

McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management ( email )

1001 Sherbrooke St. West
Montreal, Quebec H3A1G5 H3A 2M1
Canada

Patrick W. Ryu

The University of Manchester - Alliance Manchester Business School ( email )

Booth Street West
Manchester, M15 6PB
United Kingdom

Jingjing Zhang

McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management ( email )

1001 Sherbrooke St. West
Montreal, Quebec H3A1G5
Canada

Joonil Lee

Kyung Hee University ( email )

Dongdaemun-ku
Seoul, Gyeonggi-Do 446-701
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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