Social Context, Framing, and Compliance with the Law: Experimental Evidence

24 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2025

See all articles by Carlos Chavez

Carlos Chavez

University of Talca

James J. Murphy

University of Alaska Anchorage

John Stranlund

University of Massachusetts at Amherst - College of Natural Resources & the Environment - Department of Resource Economics

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Abstract

We investigate the effects of law enforcement framing and social context on compliance with the law in a lab-in-field experiment. In particular, we examine the effects of framing a simple lottery choice as a law enforcement problem, the effects of noncompliance imposing an external cost on independent third parties, and the effects of compliance providing a public good to other group members. We varied the probability of monitoring for each of these contexts from low probabilities that would not induce a risk-neutral individual to comply to high probabilities that would motivate such an individual to comply. Increased monitoring had a positive effect on compliance regardless of the context. Law enforcement framing did not increase compliance relative to the simple lottery when compliance provided a public good to group members, but the law framing had a negative effect on compliance when obeying the law did not benefit group members. Compliance was not affected when violating the law imposed an external cost on third parties. However, compliance with the law was higher when it provided a public good to group members, especially under low monitoring probabilities.

Keywords: economics experiments, field experiments, social dilemma, compliance, regulation, enforcement

Suggested Citation

Chavez, Carlos and Murphy, James J. and Stranlund, John, Social Context, Framing, and Compliance with the Law: Experimental Evidence. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5081290 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5081290

Carlos Chavez

University of Talca ( email )

James J. Murphy (Contact Author)

University of Alaska Anchorage ( email )

3211 Providence Drive
Anchorage, AK 99508
United States

John Stranlund

University of Massachusetts at Amherst - College of Natural Resources & the Environment - Department of Resource Economics ( email )

Stockbridge Hall
80 Campus Center Way
Amherst, MA 01003-9246
United States
413-545-6328 (Phone)

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