Consciousness Incorporated

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See all articles by Philip N. Pettit

Philip N. Pettit

Princeton University; Australian National University (ANU) - Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS)

Date Written: January 01, 2018

Abstract

Thomas Nagel (1979, Ch 12) introduced the topic of consciousness to contemporary philosophical debate, arguing that a mental state is conscious when, in an intuitive sense, there is something it is like for the subject to instantiate it. The question I address here is whether the incorporation of a group as an agent introduces a new collective sort of consciousness. There are good grounds for holding that incorporation as an agent brings a new intentional subject into being: a subject with a relatively autonomous structure of intentional
attitudes like belief and desire and intention (List and Pettit 2011; see too Tollefsen 2015). And those grounds naturally generate the question as to whether incorporation as an agent has an impact on consciousness that parallels its impact on intentionality. I consider that question here from the point of view of my commitment to corporate agency, and to the joint intentionality it generally presupposes. Unfortunately, I have to do so in the compass of a single article without due consideration of all alternatives.

Suggested Citation

Pettit, Philip N., Consciousness Incorporated
(January 01, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

Philip N. Pettit (Contact Author)

Princeton University ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/

Australian National University (ANU) - Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS) ( email )

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia

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